



Towards secure digital farming :


SECURITY MODEL AND RISKS ASSOCIATED TO MACHINE LEARNING

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Introduction



A. Awashti, A. Awashti, D. Riordan, J. Walsh. Non-Invasive Sensor Technology for the Development of a Dairy Cattle Health Monitoring Sys, 2016.

This paves the way for the use of Artificial Intelligence for precision and efficacity



Introduction

Use of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning introduces risks to :



Farming sector needs to improve cyber security

- U.S. Government Accountability Office (2019)
- Survey conducted by Geil et al. (2018)



Outline

I - Security model for digital farming

1.Data chain

2.Risk vectors

3. Adversary model

II - Risks to machine learning

1.Privacy of data and model


2.Integrity of model and predictions

3. Means of mitigation

Machine learning flow



- **1**. Data collected : raw data
- 2. Training dataset: pre-processed data
- 3. Training: design predictive model
- 4. Model: query and make predictions




I - Security model of digital farming 1. Data chain

Data chain describes the data life cycle between <u>resources</u> and <u>actors</u>. Wolfert et al. (2017)

Resources


- Training dataset: confidentiality
- Trained model: confidentiality, integrity
- Predictions: integrity




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I - Security model of digital farming 2. Risk vectors

Data processors have two interfaces that are the data collection (<u>upstream</u>) and model predictions (<u>downstream</u>)







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I - Security model of digital farming

3. Adversary model

<u>Goals</u>



 Financial gain: model privacy

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 Information leak: training dataset privacy



Disruption: model and prediction integrity

Capabilities



Insider: specific knowledge



 Outsider: large cyber resources and advanced skills

II - Risks to ML in digital farming

1. Confidentiality of data and model

Membership inference

- Determine if a data point is part of the training set
- Ex: On hospital discharge dataset, Shokri et al. (2017)

Model inversion

- Gain knowledge about the training dataset
- Ex: Reconstruct unknown features of patient with warfarin dosing system, Fredrikson et al. (2014)

Model theft

- Steal the model parameters or extract model behavior
- Ex: Steal model for vendor (Machine Learning as a Service), Tramèr et al. (2016)

II - Risks to ML in digital farming


2. Integrity of model and predictions

Data poisoning

- Inject malicious data point in training set to compromise the model
- Ex: Backdoor on authentication system, Chen et al. (2017)

Adversarial example

- Craft malicious request to compromise the prediction
- Ex: Evade malware detection system, Al-Dujaili et al. (2018)



88% tabby cat

99% guacamole

Adversarial example on InceptionV3 classifier

Retrieved from https://github.com/anishathalye/obfuscatedgradients/blob/master/example.png

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II - Risks to ML in digital farming

3. Means of mitigation

Differential privacy

- Increase privacy of each element in dataset by adding small noise to without affecting utility
- Membership inference, model inversion

Query auditing

- <u>Analyse queries</u> or <u>filter results</u> to prevent attacks
- Membership inference, model inversion

Robust model

- Use training techniques that increase model resilience
- Data poisoning, adversarial example



Conclusion

Digital farming must improve cyber security

ML research exposes new practical risks to security and privacy

- I. We developed a security model for digital farming
- II. We investigated risk to machine learning and practical means of mitigation

Opportunity to increase resilience of digital farming



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